Trouble In The High Seas

South China Sea(Image: WSJ)

Incisive analysis of the current imbroglio in Southeast Asia:

China, Vietnam and the Philippines represent a triad of instability and tension in the Asia-Pacific with their incompatible nationalistic claims over islets and energy-rich water bodies. (The South China Sea is estimated to hold 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.) So deeply entrenched is the animosity among the three that even the nomenclature of the terrain on which they make their shows of force is subject to controversy. For the Vietnamese, “South China Sea” is an affront; they prefer to call it the “East Sea,” i.e. the waters to the east of Vietnam’s coast. For the Philippines, the part of the South China Sea that falls within its exclusive economic zone should be called the “West Philippine Sea,” a term China dismisses. Beijing’s dreaded “nine-dash line” or “cow’s tongue” is based on arguments that the South China Sea waters and islands fell under its suzerainty during medieval times, evoking memories of an imperial past.

Although the South China Sea has long been a hotbed of rival nationalisms, the genesis of the current troubles lies in China’s post-2008 reincarnation as a more assertive regional power. Prior to that, Beijing had maintained an accommodative and non-provocative posture vis-à-vis its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors. The Chinese leadership that inherited the economic pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping around the turn of the millennium had placed a premium on avoiding hostilities with its ASEAN neighbors as it sought to deepen trade and investment links.

A disturbing pattern has now clearly emerged in Chinese behavior vis-à-vis Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Beijing makes provocative naval and aerial thrusts along the edges of disputed terrain with a view to literally testing the waters and gauging how each country will respond. The ease with which China grabbed the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea by walling it off from the Philippines has only emboldened Beijing.

China is now trying the same “cabbage strategy” of planting civilian vessels, wrapped in layers and layers of military protection, in waters claimed by Vietnam and Japan and then staying put despite howls of anger.

The only instance where China developed cold feet in this game of establishing dominion was with its ADIZ in the East China Sea. Japanese and American military aircraft ignored China’s line in the sky, regularly entering the zone with impunity. Faced with a scenario of having to walk the talk of its quarantined zone, Beijing instead quietly backed off and stopped announcing Japanese and U.S. “violations.” The lesson is clear: China is amenable only to counter-mobilization of equal or greater force by its opponents.